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Abstract
We present a theoretical framework which allows for the comparison
of the e¤ectiveness of tax measures, loans and funding, in supporting
industry-oriented research.
We estimate for each of the instruments the exact contribution required
by a rm to decide on investing in R&D, given the costs and probability of
success of the project, and the foreseen change in prot following successful
implementation of the research results. We apply Prospect
Theory to analyze the risk attitude of the rm.
By comparing the contribution required, we identify the instrument
which is most e¤ective, and therefore preferred by a government.
Our analysis indicates that there exists a critical value for the proba-
bility of success of the project for which the modality of the most e¤ective
instruments changes. For a probability of success smaller than the critical
value, a tax measures o¤ering support only in case of successful comple-
tion of the project is preferred. For a probability higher than the critical
value, a loan is most e¤ective. The value of the critical probability de-
pends on the perception of risk and loss aversion of the rm involved in
the research.
JEL Code: D04, D81, O38
1 Introduction
The global economy is showing signs of recovery after an unprecedented nancial
crisis initiated one of the most virulent recession in decades [OECD, 2010a].
These turbulent times have indicated again the importance of policies aimed at
creating stable and sustainable economic growth. Countries need to increase
their labour productivity levels by strengthening their research and innovation
capacity. This implies that remaining competitive in the future requires not
only intervening in the functioning of (nancial) markets.
Incited by institutions like the OECD and the European Commission, coun-
tries have acknowledged the relevance of long-term innovation driven growth
strategies. They have consequently implemented specic interventions aimed at
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increasing public as well as private expenditure on research [European-Commission,
2010] [OECD, 2010b]. In general, a government has several instruments at its
disposal encouraging rms to invest in research. Within the framework of this
paper, we focus on the following modalities of support: funding (e.g. subsi-
dies or in kind contributions), tax schemes, and loans. Almost all industrialized
countries have implemented these types of specic and dedicated measures sup-
porting industry-oriented research.1
In order not to impede future economic recovery, most countries have decided
to further rationalize their national budgets. The consequential retrenchments of
public expenditure requires them to consider the e¤ectiveness of the instruments
mentioned above. In other words, and adapted from [Flanagan, 2010], countries
are looking for: "...the cheapest one (i.e. measure) to implement, which least
distorts the market whilst still achieving its objective".
In this paper, we present a theoretical framework that allows for a com-
parison of the e¤ectiveness of instruments. E¤ectiveness within the framework
of this paper refers to: "the ability to change the behavior of rms regarding
investment in research, in comparison to the costs involved in the intervention".
Analysis of the literature indicates that little is known about the e¤ective-
ness of a single instruments in comparison to other tools [Boekholt et al. , 2006].
It is even argued that "...from a purely logical and technical point of view, policy
tools appear to be perfectly interchangeable" [Landry & Varone, 2005]. Policy
evaluation seems to focus on individual measures, and not on a set of instru-
ments [Flanagan, 2010]. Some empirical studies address the trade-o¤ between
instruments. In [Guellec & De La Potterie, 2003] for example it is concluded, on
the basis of an analysis of business R&D and government funding in seventeen
OECD countries, that direct government funding and tax incentives have a pos-
itive e¤ect on business nanced R&D. Both measures appear to be substitutes:
the increase in one reduces the e¤ect of the other. Evaluation of the Dutch
scal measure WBSO2 indicated, on the basis of results of a questionnaire, that
rms and governments prefer tax-deductions over other forms of nancial sup-
port, because of the simplicity of application, and the fact that a large part of
the infrastructure required for the policy delivery is available [Brouwer et al. ,
2002]. Theoretical research on policy formulation builds mainly on multi-stage
strategic investment games from industrial organization. Relevant papers such
as [Hinloopen, 1997] and [Hinloopen, 2000] compare subsidizing with measures
supporting collaboration in research. And in [Spencer & Brander, 1983] and
[Inci, 2008] the use of subsidies is assessed in combination with generic tax
measures.
We adopt a series of assumption with which we deviate from the existing
theoretical research on policy formulation, as to reect more adequately the cur-
rent practice concerning industry-oriented research, and the modality of support
allowed under the state aid rules [European-Commission, 2006]. We embrace a
1For an overview, check: www.proinno-europe.eu, or www.cordis.europa.eu/erawatch, or
www.oecd.org.
2WBSO: "Wet Bevordering Speur- en Ontwikkelingswerk" or "R&D Work Stimulation
Act".
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problem driven innovation model, in which R&D is conducted within the frame-
work of a predened project, originating from an idea addressing a specic issue.
We assume that the accompanying costs of the project are predetermined, and
the outcome of the R&D process is foreseen. Successful execution of a research
project involves a certain probability of failure. Only a subset of the population
of rms will conduct research. Intervention is directed towards those involved
with the idea and the related R&D. The prevailing literature on the contrary
applies a linear, research driven innovation model. The impact of R&D on
prot is considered to be a function of the investment research. All rms of
the population are assumed to be involved in innovation, induced by generic
instruments.
In order to assess the willingness of the rm to invest in this research project
with an associated risk, we apply Prospect Theory as introduced in [Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979]. The willingness to invest is dened by the valuation of the
potential gains and losses associated with the implementation of the project,
and the weighing of the risk involved in conducting the research.
We argue that if a rm is not willing to invest, a government has the pos-
sibility to intervene, and implement measures such that the rm will alter its
behavior, and decide to conduct the R&D. We calculate for each instrument the
exact amount of support required by the rm from the government to imple-
ment the project. We identify the most e¤ective instrument by comparing the
expected earnings resulting from the intervention for a government. We apply
Expected Value theory to describe the behavior of a government concerning
valuation of its earnings
The choice for behavioral model for the actors is motivated as follows: In
decision analysis, Expected Utility theory (EU) is considered to be the right
normative model for decision under uncertainty [Bleichrodt et al. , 2001]. We
therefore apply EU to analyze the behavior of a government. But as the expected
contribution required to initiate the research is relatively small for a government,
we assume that its utility function can be well approximated by a linear function.
EU consequently reduces in our case to Expected Value theory, in line [Arrow,
1962]. Prospect Theory (PT) on the other hand does a much better job than EU
in predicting the behavior of individuals and small entities (e.g. SMEs) in risky
situations [Kahneman & Tversky, 1979]. We therefore analyze the behavior of
the rm under uncertainty using PT.
Our analysis indicates that there exists a critical value for the probability of
success of the project for which the modality of the most e¤ective instruments
changes. For a probability of success smaller than the critical value, a tax
measures o¤ering support only in case of successful completion of the project is
preferred. For a probability higher than the critical vale, a loan is most e¤ective.
The value of the critical probability depends on the perception of risk and loss
aversion of the rm involved in the research. Our paper shows furthermore that
the current approach towards support for industry-oriented research, as dened
by [European-Commission, 2006], results in the implementation of measures
such that they are not e¤ective.
The next sections describe the model used, main results, and conclusions
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and recommendations with emphasis on the implications for policy formulation.
The annex includes the technical proofs.
2 Model for investment in R&D
2.1 Investment decision on research by a rm
We assume that the industry consist of two rms: I = fi; kg, with initial cor-
responding prot f0i ; 0kg. Firm k now has an idea to increase its prot. Suc-
cessful translation of this idea into a market application requires conducting a
research project with costs K, and probability of success p 2 [0; 1]. The project
costs K are predened, and budgeted according to foreseen allocation of re-
sources. The probability p depends on the current level of knowledge and state
of the art in the research eld of the project. If the required knowledge is not
available, and lies beyond the current state of the art p will be close to 0. If the
required knowledge is available p will be close to 1. Successful implementation
of the research results will lead to a change in prot according to f i ; +k g, with
 i  0i and +k > 0k + K.3 If the research project fails, the corresponding
prot equals

0i ; 
0
k  K
	
.
Investment in the project involves a risk, and we assume that Prospect The-
ory [Kahneman & Tversky, 1979] describes the behavior of the rm in this
situation. Within the framework of Prospect Theory (PT), losses and gains
relative to some predened reference point are the carriers of value. It is a well
known empirical phenomenon that losses loom larger than gains[Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979]. PT models this phenomenon by weighting the losses relative
to gains with a loss aversion parameter  > 1.
Also in Prospect Theory, probabilities are distorted by a probability weighting
function, which over-weights low probabilities and under-weights high probabil-
ities. [Tversky & Kahneman, 1992] propose the following family of weighting
functions:
w(p) =
p
(p + (1  p)) 1
: (1)
In this paper we assume the family of probability weighting functions with
parameter  2 [0:28; 1). On this interval the lower the value of  the more
the distortion in probabilities (e.g. [Tversky & Kahneman, 1992] estimated
 = 0:61, see Figure 1).4
In Prospect Theory, gains and losses are furthermore evaluated by means
of a utility function. In Expected Utility theory, the curvature of a utility
3Our model holds under di¤erent market structures. As an example, consider two rms
competing in a market on price (i.e. Cournot competition). Now assume that rm k has
an idea that will change the marginal cost of production. Successful implementation of the
research results will increase the pay-o¤ for the innovating rm, while decreasing the prot
for the other rm.
4For  < 0:28 the probability weighting functions are not strictly increasing; for  > 1 they
over-weight small probabilities rather than under-weight them; and for  = 1 the function is
linear (i.e. no distortion of the probabilities).
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Figure 1: Weighting function
function is solely used to analyze risk attitude. But in PT risk attitude largely
depends upon probability distortion function and loss aversion. So for the sake
of simplicity, we assume the utility function to be piecewise linear within the
framework of our paper.
The outcome of the investment in the research project as described in this
paper can be represented as a binary prospect yielding (+k  K) with probability
p, and (0k K) with probability (1  p). We adopt a notation which represents
this as (+k   K)p(0k   K). The decision problem for the rm is to choose
between this prospect or the old prot 0k. The natural reference point for this
decision problem is 0k.
The value function, which shows the result of the aggregation of gains and
losses of the rm, is consequently given by:
V = w(p)
 
(1  f)  +k   0k K+ w(1  p) ( K) : (2)
In our model, we assume a fraction f of tax collected by the government on
the prot. The value function shows the gain as the prot after successful
implementation of the research result, minus the project costs, relative to the
reference point. The loss reects the other outcome of the binary prospect
relative to the reference point. Both gain and loss are weighted, but only the
latter includes the loss aversion parameter.
The rm will decide on investing in the research project if and only if the
result of the value function is not less than zero.
2.2 Contribution to the research by the government
If the result of the value function is negative, a government has the possibil-
ity to intervene, and implement policy instruments such that rm k will con-
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sider altering its behavior, and decide on conducting the R&D.5 The rationale
for government intervention supporting basic research has been established by
[Nelson, 1959] and [Arrow, 1962]. They argue that the di¢ culty of selecting po-
tentially marketable research and the uncertainty with respect to its successful
outcome limits incentives of industry to conduct R&D. The indivisible and non-
excludable character of this type of research, and the fact that its results are
almost freely available in scientic publications further enhances the tendency
to under-invests in R&D. This market failure argument has been further sophis-
ticated by [Ja¤e, 1996] as a rationale for supporting pre-competitive industry
oriented research. In his work he identies additional types of spill-overs that
negatively a¤ect decisions of rms concerning investments in research. These
types refer to appropriability of knowledge (for example through imitation),
the benets to users of the innovation not captured in its price, and network
spill-overs (when successful innovation relies upon developments in related tech-
nologies.
We argue that a government should select the instrument that maximizes
its expected earning Ey. The earnings are dened by the taxation on rms with
a fraction f on the prot, and the expected contribution I corresponding to a
specic instrument, required to initiate the research:
Ey = pf
 
+k + 
 
i

+ (1  p) f  0i + 0k  I (3)
If the expected government earning of a certain Instrument A is more than
that of Instrument B then we say Instrument A performs better than Instrument
B.
2.3 Instruments
We identify four di¤erent modalities of support for rms conducting research.
The contribution is provided in di¤erent stages of the project, depending on
success or failure of the outcome.
2.3.1 Funding
A government can contribute to the project costs by o¤ering direct funding
(e.g. subsidies and grants), or indirect funding (e.g. as access to research in-
frastructure, vouchers, rebate on social insurance, and advice). The rst type
of funding involves an actual transfer of funds, which are not recoverable by the
government from the beneciary. With the latter, a government tries to com-
pensate for the costs by providing in kind resources. We assume that Funding
is allocated unconditionally, i.e. in case of success or failure.
If F is the minimum amount of funding required to initiate the research
project, then the corresponding value function of the rm, as given in (2) be-
5 In practice, intervention as such is limited: the total government costs (on project level),
which include implementation costs and the actual contribution to initiate the research, should
never be too high, in that they should not undo the gain in social surplus.
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comes:
w(p)
 
(1  f)  +k   0k+ F  K+ w(1  p) (F  K) = 0: (4)
And the corresponding expected government earnings EF (3) is:
EF = pf
 
+k + 
 
i

+ (1  p) f  0i + 0k  F: (5)
2.3.2 Unconditional tax-rebate
Support can also be o¤ered proportional to the expected prot. We rst analyze
a tax rebate given unconditionally on whether the project succeeds or fails. Let
t be the minimum fraction of tax rebate required to initiate the research project,
then the value function of the rm is:
w(p)
 
(1  f)  +k   0k+ t+k  K+ w(1  p)  t0k  K = 0; (6)
with corresponding expected government earnings Et denoted by:
Et = pf
 
+k + 
 
i

+ (1  p) f  0i + 0k  t  p+k + (1  p)0k : (7)
2.3.3 Conditional tax-rebate
A tax rebate can be provided also only in case the project is completed success-
fully. Let  be the minimum fraction of conditional tax rebate, then the value
function of the rm is:
w(p)
 
(1  f)  +k   0k+ +k  K+ w(1  p) ( K) = 0;
with corresponding expected government earnings E denoted by:
E = pf
 
+k + 
 
i

+ (1  p) f  0i + 0k  p+k :
2.3.4 Loans
Loans involves the allocation of funds which have to be reimbursed by the rm
to the government in case the research project is implemented successfully. Let
L be the minimum amount provided by means of a loan required to initiate the
research project, then the value function of the rm is:
w(p)
 
(1  f)  +k   0k K+ w(1  p) (L K) = 0;
with corresponding expected government earnings EL denoted by:
EL = pf
 
+k + 
 
i

+ (1  p) f  0i + 0k  (1  p)L:
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2.4 Main results
By comparing the expected earnings from the government resulting from the
implementation of the di¤erent instruments, we can assess the performance of
measures compared to tools.
Theorem 1 For p < pc the order of instruments in terms of performance from
best to worst equals: conditional tax-rebate, unconditional tax-rebate, funding,
loan. For p > pc the above ordering is reversed. For p = pc all instruments
perform equally well. The critical probability of success of the research project
for which the disposition changes is given by:
pc =
1
1 + 
1
1 
:
The proof for Theorem 1 is given in the Appendix. The intuition behind
the theorem is as follows: . For p < pc a scal measure that allocates support
only in case of success provides the highest actual transfer of resources to a
rm, in comparison to the other tools. In case of such a conditional tax-rebate,
this contribution is of course granted only in case the research project is con-
ducted successfully. But the valuation of this support, as dened by the utility
function, and the weighing of the probability of success, as stipulated by the
weighing function, is such that a rm is willing to take the risk, and conduct the
research for an indemnication that results in the lowest expected contribution
by a government. For a high probability of success for the research project, the
reasoning is similar for a loan. In practice, a measure is preferred over other in-
struments if its corresponding expected contribution, allocated by a government
to a rm, is lower than that of other tools
Corollary 2 For p < pc a conditional tax-rebate is most e¤ective. For p > pc
a loan is the optimal strategy.
With the help of our model, we are able to dene for each of the instruments
the exact contribution required by the rm to alter its behavior. The change in
market equilibria causing the expected gain in prot by the rm results from
the foreseen implementation of the research results, and not from the transfer of
support. The contribution itself is appropriated merely to amend the prospect
of the rm such that it will initiate the project. We therefore maintain that
we have dened a framework for the selection of instruments, such that they
are e¢ cient. We also have dened our model such that all measure induce a
similar level of e¤orts in R&D. Based on our analysis, we therefore conclude
that unconditional tax rebates and loans are most e¤ective, as they require
the lowest level of contribution to initiate the research project, and therefore
maximize government earnings.
Remark 3 If we assume  =  = 1 within the framework of our model,
Prospect Theory reduces to Expected Value theory, and all instruments perform
equally well.
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Without applying Prospect Theory, we nd that all instruments require the
same level of expected contribution to initiate research. This is in line with what
is argued in the literature [Landry & Varone, 2005]. Our framework indicates
that there are di¤erences in the e¤ectiveness of instruments, resulting from
our assumptions concerning risk aversion and the perception of risk involved in
conducting the research by the rm.
3 Conclusions and recommendations
Theorem 1 indicates that our results do not depend on initial prot, or a change
in pay-o¤ after implementation of the project. This implies that the result holds
under di¤erent market structures (e.g. di¤erentiated markets under Cournot or
Bertrand). We therefore maintain that our result is robust.
The current practice regarding funding of collaborative research foresees in
a contribution of 50-80% to the costs of the project, regardless of the risks
involved in the R&D. The exact level of funding depends on the type of research
conducted (e.g. experimental research, or industry-oriented research close to the
market), or actor involved (e.g. SMEs, MNFs) [European-Commission, 2006].
Based on our model we argue that under this legal framework, projects requiring
a higher level of support will not be conducted, as the rm with the idea will
not receive su¢ cient funding to make up its willingness to invest in the required
research. We therefore argue that under these conditions the measures are not
e¤ective as they are not able to change behavior of the rm. We also maintain
that projects which have been conducted with the help of support according to
state aid rules in practice most likely would have required less contribution than
provided. We therefore contend that under these conditions the instruments are
not e¤ective as they are not e¢ cient.
Our paper suggests that redening the approach towards support for indus-
try oriented research, and the legal framework governing it, could improve the
e¤ectiveness of policy aimed at strengthening the innovation system. Adopting
our model as a basis for policy delivery however requires further analysis of the
factors which dene the investment decision of rms (i.e. perception of risk
and loss aversion), and how they vary (e.g. for type of rm, or sector). As an
example, if we assume the perception of risk to be given and constant, we see
that the critical probability of success changes with the risk aversion of the rm
involved. This implies that if rms within a certain sector are more risk averse
than those in other sectors, their corresponding pc is di¤erent (e.g. lower), and
as a consequence a loan might be more attractive as a tool to support their
research projects.
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A Proofs
Proof of the Theorem 1 follows trivially from Lemma 4, Lemma 5 and Lemma
6 below. Since proofs of these lemmas are similar, we only provide the proof for
Lemma 5.
Lemma 4 For p < pc Conditional tax-rebate performs better than Uncondi-
tional tax-rebate, and for p > pc reverse is true.
Lemma 5 For p < pc Unconditional tax-rebate performs better than Funding,
and for p > pc reverse is true.
Lemma 6 For p < pc Funding performs better than a Loan, and for p > pc
reverse is true.
Proof. Funding performs better than Unconditional tax-rebate if and only if
EF > Et, where EF and Et are dened according to equation (5) and (7). From
(4) and (6) we get:
(w(p) + w(1  p))F = (w(p)+k + w(1  p)0k)t
If we let  = +k =
 
i then from the above equation it follows that:
EF > Et () w(p) + w(1  p)
(p + (1  p))(w(p) + w(1  p) < 1
With (1) we get that:
EF > Et () p + (1  p) < (p + (1  p))(p + (1  p))
Let r = p= (1  p), then:
EF > Et ()
r +  < (p + (1  p))(r + ) ()
r(1  p)  r(1  p) < (p + (1  p)  1) ()
r(1  p)(   1) < p(   1) ()
r 1 < 
EF > Et () r > 
 1
1  since  < 1
EF > Et () p > 1
1 + 
1
1 
For p > pc Funding performs better than Unconditional tax-rebate, and for
p < pc reverse is true.
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